WHEN SHOULD WE (NOT) INTERPRET LINEAR IV ESTIMANDS AS LATE? Online Appendix

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Appendix A Proofs

Proof of Theorem 3.2. Lemma 3.1 states that $\beta_{2SLS} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[\sigma^2(X) \cdot \tau(X)]}{\mathbb{E}[\sigma^2(X)]}$. It remains to show that $\sigma^2(X) = [\pi(X)]^2 \cdot \text{Var}[Z \mid X]$. Indeed, it follows from the definition of $\sigma^2(X)$, equation (4), and iterated expectations that $\sigma^2(X) = [\omega(X)]^2 \cdot \text{Var}[Z \mid X]$. Then, it follows from Lemma 2.1 that $\sigma^2(X) = [\pi(X)]^2 \cdot \text{Var}[Z \mid X]$ because $[\omega(X)]^2 = [\pi(X)]^2$ under Assumptions IV and WM.

Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let R and T be generic notation for two random variables, where T is binary and R is arbitrarily discrete or continuous. The following lemma, due to Angrist (1998), will be useful for what follows.

Lemma A.1 (Angrist, 1998). Suppose that E[T | X] is linear in X. Then, ξ , the coefficient on T in the linear projection of R on T and X can be written as

$$\xi = \frac{\mathrm{E}\left[\mathrm{Var}\left[T \mid X\right] \cdot \xi(X)\right]}{\mathrm{E}\left[\mathrm{Var}\left[T \mid X\right]\right]},$$

where $\xi(X) = E[R | T = 1, X] - E[R | T = 0, X].$

Recall that β_{IV} is equal to the ratio of the reduced-form and first-stage coefficients on Z. It follows that we can apply Lemma A.1 separately to these two coefficients, and thereby obtain the following expression for the estimand of interest:

$$\beta_{\rm IV} = \frac{\frac{E\left[\operatorname{Var}[Z|X] \cdot \phi(X)\right]}{E\left[\operatorname{Var}[Z|X]\right]}}{\frac{E\left[\operatorname{Var}[Z|X] \cdot \omega(X)\right]}{E\left[\operatorname{Var}[Z|X]\right]}},\tag{A.1}$$

where

$$\phi(x) = \mathbf{E}[Y \mid Z = 1, X = x] - \mathbf{E}[Y \mid Z = 0, X = x]$$
(A.2)

is the conditional reduced-form slope coefficient and $\omega(x)$ is as defined in equation (5). Upon rearrangement, we obtain

$$\beta_{\rm IV} = \frac{\mathrm{E}\left[\operatorname{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \phi(X)\right]}{\mathrm{E}\left[\operatorname{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \omega(X)\right]}$$
$$= \frac{\mathrm{E}\left[\operatorname{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \omega(X) \cdot \beta(X)\right]}{\mathrm{E}\left[\operatorname{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \omega(X)\right]}, \tag{A.3}$$

where the second equality uses the definition of $\beta(x)$ in equation (6). See also Walters (2018) for a similar argument. Finally, we know from Lemma 2.1 that $\beta(x) = \tau(x)$ and $\omega(x) = c(x) \cdot \pi(x)$ under

Assumptions IV and WM. This completes the proof because β_{IV} can now be written as

$$\beta_{\rm IV} = \frac{\mathrm{E}\left[c(X) \cdot \pi(X) \cdot \operatorname{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \tau(X)\right]}{\mathrm{E}\left[c(X) \cdot \pi(X) \cdot \operatorname{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right]\right]}.$$
(A.4)

Alternative Proof of Theorem 3.3. The following proof of Theorem 3.3 uses Kolesár (2013)'s result in Remark 3.4. Let us begin by restating the representation of two-step IV estimands in equation (13):

$$\beta_{\text{TSIV}} = \int \sum_{j=1}^{J_x-1} \frac{\theta_j(x)}{\int \sum_{j=1}^{J_x-1} \theta_j(x) \, \mathrm{d}F^X(x)} \, \tau(p_{j,x}; x) \, \mathrm{d}F^X(x). \tag{A.5}$$

The notation is the same as in Remark 3.4. The representation in equation (A.5) is appropriate for any two-step IV estimand (*e.g.*, 2SLS) which uses $Z_G = z_G(X, Z)$ as instruments, as long as *D* is binary, *Z* is discrete, and the relevant assumptions are satisfied. When *Z* is binary and $Z_G = Z$, we get $\tau(p_{1,x}; x) = \tau(x)$ and $\beta_{TSIV} = \beta_{IV}$, and we can use equation (A.5) to write

$$\beta_{\text{IV}} = \int \frac{\theta_1(x)}{\int \theta_1(x) \, dF^X(x)} \tau(x) \, dF^X(x)$$

= $\frac{\mathrm{E}\left[\theta_1(X) \cdot \tau(X)\right]}{\mathrm{E}\left[\theta_1(X)\right]},$ (A.6)

where

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_{1}(x) &= (p_{2,x} - p_{1,x}) \cdot \mathbb{P}\left[P > p_{1,x} \mid X = x\right] \cdot \mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{P}^{L} \mid X = x, P > p_{1,x}\right] \\ &= \left|\mathbb{E}\left[D \mid Z = 1, X = x\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[D \mid Z = 0, X = x\right]\right| \cdot \mathbb{P}\left[P > p_{1,x} \mid X = x\right] \\ &\quad \cdot \mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{P}^{L} \mid X = x, P > p_{1,x}\right] \\ &= \pi(x) \cdot \left(1[\omega(x) > 0] \cdot \mathbb{P}\left[Z = 1 \mid X = x\right] \cdot \mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{P}^{L} \mid X = x, Z = 1\right] \\ &\quad + 1[\omega(x) < 0] \cdot \mathbb{P}\left[Z = 0 \mid X = x\right] \cdot \mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{P}^{L} \mid X = x, Z = 0\right]\right). \end{aligned}$$
(A.7)

Next, if $Z_G = Z$, we get $\tilde{P}^L = L[D | Z, X] - L[D | X]$. If we write $L[D | Z, X] = Z\delta + X\zeta$, then $L[D | X] = L[Z | X]\delta + X\zeta$, which implies that, under Assumption PS, $\tilde{P}^L = (Z - L[Z | X])\delta = (Z - E[Z | X])\delta$. It follows that $E[\tilde{P}^L | X, Z = 1] = (1 - E[Z | X])\delta = P[Z = 0 | X] \cdot \delta$ and $E[\tilde{P}^L | X, Z = 0] = (0 - E[Z | X])\delta = -P[Z = 1 | X] \cdot \delta$, and further that

$$\theta_{1}(x) = \pi(x) \cdot \left(\mathbb{1}[\omega(x) > 0] \cdot \mathbb{P}[Z = 1 \mid X = x] \cdot \mathbb{P}[Z = 0 \mid X = x] \cdot \delta - \mathbb{1}[\omega(x) < 0] \cdot \mathbb{P}[Z = 0 \mid X = x] \cdot \mathbb{P}[Z = 1 \mid X = x] \cdot \delta \right)$$

$$= \pi(x) \cdot c(x) \cdot \operatorname{Var}[Z \mid X = x] \cdot \delta, \qquad (A.8)$$

which finally implies that

$$\beta_{\text{IV}} = \frac{\text{E}\left[c(X) \cdot \pi(X) \cdot \text{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \delta \cdot \tau(X)\right]}{\text{E}\left[c(X) \cdot \pi(X) \cdot \text{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \delta\right]}$$
$$= \frac{\text{E}\left[c(X) \cdot \pi(X) \cdot \text{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \tau(X)\right]}{\text{E}\left[c(X) \cdot \pi(X) \cdot \text{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right]\right]}.$$
(A.9)

This completes the proof.

Proof of Corollary 3.4. Recall that Assumption SM is a special case of Assumption WM where the existence of compliers but no defiers is postulated at all covariate values and the existence of defiers but no compliers everywhere else (*i.e.* on an empty set). Thus, it follows from Theorem 3.3 that, under Assumptions IV, SM, and PS, $\beta_{IV} = \frac{E[c(X) \cdot \pi(X) \cdot Var[Z|X] \cdot \pi(X)]}{E[c(X) \cdot \pi(X) \cdot Var[Z|X]]}$ and c(X) = 1 a.s.

Reordered IV. Remark 3.6 suggests using $Z_R = 1[\omega(X) > 0] \cdot Z + 1[\omega(X) < 0] \cdot (1 - Z)$ as a new, "reordered" instrument in a noninteracted specification. This instrument is binary and takes the value 1 if either Z = 1 and $\omega(X) > 0$ or Z = 0 and $\omega(X) < 0$; it also takes the value 0 if either Z = 0 and $\omega(X) > 0$ or Z = 1 and $\omega(X) < 0$. It follows that Z_R takes the value 1 for this value of the original instrument that encourages treatment conditional on X and the value 0 otherwise. When we construct the linear IV estimand using Z_R rather than Z, we obtain

$$\beta_{\text{RIV}} = \left[\left(\mathbf{E} \left[Q'_{\text{R}} W \right] \right)^{-1} \mathbf{E} \left[Q'_{\text{R}} Y \right] \right]_{1}, \qquad (A.10)$$

where $Q_R = (Z_R, X)$ and, as before, W = (D, X). Formally, we establish the following result.

Corollary A.2 (Reordered IV). Suppose that Assumptions IV and WM hold. Suppose further that $E[Z_R | X] = X\alpha_R$. Then

$$\beta_{\text{RIV}} = \frac{\text{E}\left[\pi(X) \cdot \text{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \tau(X)\right]}{\text{E}\left[\pi(X) \cdot \text{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right]\right]}$$

Proof. The assumption that the conditional mean of the instrument is linear in X underlies the proof of Theorem 3.3, including equation (A.3). Under this assumption, we can use equation (A.3) to write

$$\beta_{\text{RIV}} = \frac{\mathbb{E}\left[\operatorname{Var}\left[Z_{\text{R}} \mid X\right] \cdot \omega_{\text{R}}(X) \cdot \beta_{\text{R}}(X)\right]}{\mathbb{E}\left[\operatorname{Var}\left[Z_{\text{R}} \mid X\right] \cdot \omega_{\text{R}}(X)\right]},\tag{A.11}$$

where

$$\omega_{\rm R}(x) = {\rm E}\left[D \mid Z_{\rm R} = 1, X = x\right] - {\rm E}\left[D \mid Z_{\rm R} = 0, X = x\right] \tag{A.12}$$

and

$$\beta_{\rm R}(x) = \frac{\phi_{\rm R}(x)}{\omega_{\rm R}(x)},\tag{A.13}$$

where

$$\phi_{\rm R}(x) = {\rm E}\left[Y \mid Z_{\rm R} = 1, X = x\right] - {\rm E}\left[Y \mid Z_{\rm R} = 0, X = x\right]. \tag{A.14}$$

Then, it is important to see that $\omega_R(x) = \omega(x)$ and $\phi_R(x) = \phi(x)$ if $\omega(x) > 0$, $\omega_R(x) = -\omega(x)$ and $\phi_R(x) = -\phi(x)$ if $\omega(x) < 0$, and consequently $\beta_R(x) = \beta(x)$ regardless of the sign of $\omega(x)$. We can also write $\omega_R(x) = c(x) \cdot \omega(x)$, $\phi_R(x) = c(x) \cdot \phi(x)$, and $\operatorname{Var}[Z_R \mid X = x] = \operatorname{Var}[Z \mid X = x]$ regardless of the sign of $\omega(x)$. It follows that

$$\beta_{\text{RIV}} = \frac{\text{E}\left[\text{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot c(X) \cdot \omega(X) \cdot \beta(X)\right]}{\text{E}\left[\text{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot c(X) \cdot \omega(X)\right]}.$$
(A.15)

To complete this proof, note that, under Assumptions IV and WM, we know from Lemma 2.1 that $\beta(x) = \tau(x)$ and $\omega(x) = c(x) \cdot \pi(x)$. Also, $[c(x)]^2 = 1$ because $c(x) \in \{-1, 1\}$. Thus, it follows that

$$\beta_{\text{RIV}} = \frac{E\left[\operatorname{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \left[c(X)\right]^2 \cdot \pi(X) \cdot \tau(X)\right]}{E\left[\operatorname{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \left[c(X)\right]^2 \cdot \pi(X)\right]}$$
$$= \frac{E\left[\operatorname{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \pi(X) \cdot \tau(X)\right]}{E\left[\operatorname{Var}\left[Z \mid X\right] \cdot \pi(X)\right]}.$$
(A.16)

This completes the proof.

Appendix B Simulations

| | | N = 3,000 | | | N = 10,000 | 1 | | N = 50,000 | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------------|---------|--------|----------------|-------|--------|----------------|-------|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE |
| OLS | -0.670 | -0.669 | 3.113 | -0.670 | -0.669 | 12.66 | -0.669 | -0.669 | 163.1 |
| IV | 0.005 | 0.000 | 0.121 | -0.001 | -0.001 | 0.128 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.325 |
| 2SLS | -0.371 | -0.372 | 1.000 | -0.179 | -0.180 | 1.000 | -0.044 | -0.044 | 1.000 |
| MB2SLS | 0.261 | 0.228 | 1.140 | 0.025 | 0.023 | 0.218 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.368 |
| JIVE | 2.900 | 0.700 | 5.1e+04 | 0.393 | 0.383 | 5.073 | 0.055 | 0.055 | 1.546 |
| IJIVE | -0.049 | -0.054 | 0.252 | -0.006 | -0.010 | 0.182 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.357 |
| UJIVE | 0.024 | 0.013 | 0.327 | 0.001 | -0.002 | 0.186 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.357 |
| FEJIV | 0.028 | 0.010 | 0.419 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.188 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.357 |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 11.30 | | | 33.99 | | | 173.25 | |
| 90.05 | | 8.04 | | | 28.50 | | | 161.83 | |
| 90.95 | | 14.82 | | | 39.74 | | | 184.88 | |

Table B.1: Simulation Results for K = 250, "Strong" IV, and No Monotonicity Violations

| | | N = 3,000 |) | | N = 10,000 | | | N = 50,000 | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------------|---------|--------|----------------|-------|--------|----------------|-------|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE |
| OLS | -1.051 | -1.050 | 3.204 | -1.051 | -1.051 | 11.67 | -1.051 | -1.051 | 151.0 |
| IV | 0.190 | 0.180 | 0.303 | 0.172 | 0.173 | 0.499 | 0.173 | 0.173 | 4.551 |
| 2SLS | -0.575 | -0.578 | 1.000 | -0.297 | -0.299 | 1.000 | -0.074 | -0.074 | 1.000 |
| MB2SLS | 0.183 | 0.143 | 0.439 | -0.017 | -0.020 | 0.148 | -0.004 | -0.005 | 0.305 |
| JIVE | 68.98 | 1.944 | 1.5e+07 | 0.561 | 0.552 | 3.882 | 0.081 | 0.080 | 1.273 |
| IJIVE | -0.048 | -0.061 | 0.226 | -0.005 | -0.006 | 0.154 | 0.000 | -0.001 | 0.306 |
| UJIVE | 0.062 | 0.047 | 0.315 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.158 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.307 |
| FEJIV | 0.099 | 0.077 | 0.363 | 0.013 | 0.010 | 0.157 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.307 |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 11.48 | | | 33.45 | | | 162.81 | |
| $q_{0.05}$ | | 8.20 | | | 28.52 | | | 152.88 | |
| <i>q</i> _0.95 | | 15.08 | | | 38.69 | | | 172.65 | |

Table B.2: Simulation Results for K = 250, "Strong" IV, and Moderate Monotonicity Violations

| | | N = 3,000 |) | | N = 10,000 | | | N = 50,000 | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------------|---------|--------|----------------|-------|--------|----------------|-------|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE |
| OLS | -1.058 | -1.059 | 3.132 | -1.060 | -1.060 | 11.29 | -1.059 | -1.059 | 147.4 |
| IV | 0.729 | 0.546 | 4.686 | 0.564 | 0.551 | 4.983 | 0.545 | 0.541 | 43.22 |
| 2SLS | -0.586 | -0.588 | 1.000 | -0.305 | -0.307 | 1.000 | -0.077 | -0.078 | 1.000 |
| MB2SLS | 0.038 | 0.024 | 0.251 | -0.047 | -0.050 | 0.151 | -0.011 | -0.013 | 0.271 |
| JIVE | -11.89 | 2.337 | 1.4e+06 | 0.527 | 0.515 | 3.309 | 0.077 | 0.075 | 1.091 |
| IJIVE | -0.058 | -0.073 | 0.234 | -0.005 | -0.007 | 0.148 | 0.000 | -0.002 | 0.262 |
| UJIVE | 0.056 | 0.030 | 0.327 | 0.007 | 0.006 | 0.153 | 0.000 | -0.001 | 0.262 |
| FEJIV | 0.099 | 0.074 | 0.357 | 0.014 | 0.012 | 0.153 | 0.000 | -0.001 | 0.262 |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 11.61 | | | 32.16 | | | 155.20 | |
| $q_{0.05}$ | | 8.07 | | | 27.72 | | | 146.33 | |
| Q 0.95 | | 15.66 | | | 36.54 | | | 165.50 | |

Table B.3: Simulation Results for K = 250, "Strong" IV, and Large Monotonicity Violations

| | N = 3,000 | | | | N = 10,000 | | - | N = 50,000 | | |
|------------------------------------|-----------|----------------|-------|--------|----------------|-------|--------|----------------|-------|--|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | |
| OLS | -1.127 | -1.128 | 2.354 | -1.125 | -1.126 | 6.550 | -1.125 | -1.125 | 72.16 | |
| IV | 0.811 | 0.629 | 24.01 | 0.678 | 0.600 | 4.107 | 0.641 | 0.633 | 26.21 | |
| 2SLS | -0.721 | -0.726 | 1.000 | -0.427 | -0.429 | 1.000 | -0.120 | -0.119 | 1.000 | |
| MB2SLS | 0.146 | 0.079 | 0.600 | -0.072 | -0.076 | 0.167 | -0.018 | -0.018 | 0.241 | |
| JIVE | -3.500 | -3.108 | 257.9 | 1.185 | 1.076 | 9.265 | 0.128 | 0.128 | 1.235 | |
| IJIVE | -0.058 | -0.108 | 0.429 | -0.011 | -0.020 | 0.174 | -0.001 | -0.002 | 0.231 | |
| UJIVE | 0.164 | 0.058 | 0.996 | 0.008 | -0.002 | 0.183 | -0.001 | -0.001 | 0.232 | |
| FEJIV | 0.220 | 0.116 | 1.757 | 0.019 | 0.008 | 0.180 | -0.001 | -0.001 | 0.232 | |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 7.64 | | | 20.47 | | | 99.71 | | |
| $q_{0.05}$ | | 5.09 | | | 16.36 | | | 92.88 | | |
| Q 0.95 | | 10.82 | | | 24.61 | | | 107.47 | | |

Table B.4: Simulation Results for K = 250, "Strong" IV, and Monotonicity Violations with Weak Cells

| | | N = 3,000 | | | N = 10,000 | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------------|---------|--------|----------------|---------|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE |
| OLS | -0.737 | -0.736 | 1.875 | -0.737 | -0.736 | 5.975 |
| IV | 0.070 | -0.004 | 1.368 | 0.024 | 0.010 | 0.902 |
| 2SLS | -0.426 | -0.419 | 1.000 | -0.199 | -0.204 | 1.000 |
| MB2SLS | 0.696 | -0.009 | 193.4 | 0.053 | 0.021 | 1.569 |
| JIVE | -1.586 | -1.084 | 1.2e+03 | 1.092 | 0.559 | 3.0e+03 |
| IJIVE | 0.384 | -0.055 | 440.5 | 0.058 | 0.023 | 1.671 |
| UJIVE | -1.492 | -0.039 | 8.0e+04 | 0.065 | 0.026 | 1.755 |
| FEJIV | -1.280 | -0.012 | 2.1e+03 | 0.063 | 0.027 | 1.700 |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 2.80 | | | 7.84 | |
| $q_{0.05}$ | | 0.28 | | | 4.14 | |
| $q_{0.95}$ | | 6.15 | | | 12.49 | |

Table B.5: Simulation Results for K = 20, "Weak" IV, and No Monotonicity Violations

| | | N = 3,000 | | | N = 10,000 | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------------|---------|--------|----------------|---------|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE |
| OLS | -1.134 | -1.132 | 1.949 | -1.133 | -1.132 | 6.075 |
| IV | 2.716 | 0.186 | 8.0e+03 | 0.277 | 0.199 | 2.317 |
| 2SLS | -0.663 | -0.652 | 1.000 | -0.312 | -0.318 | 1.000 |
| MB2SLS | 0.295 | -0.095 | 386.4 | 0.051 | -0.011 | 1.540 |
| JIVE | -2.849 | -1.689 | 1.6e+03 | -3.561 | 0.768 | 6.6e+04 |
| IJIVE | 1.833 | -0.072 | 3.4e+03 | 0.092 | 0.031 | 1.801 |
| UJIVE | 2.511 | -0.061 | 1.2e+04 | 0.102 | 0.035 | 1.899 |
| FEJIV | 1.033 | -0.027 | 1.1e+03 | 0.099 | 0.033 | 1.769 |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 2.62 | | | 7.75 | |
| $q_{0.05}$ | | 0.24 | | | 3.90 | |
| $q_{0.95}$ | | 5.50 | | | 12.03 | |

Table B.6: Simulation Results for K = 20, "Weak" IV, and Moderate Monotonicity Violations

| | | N = 3,000 | | | N = 10,000 | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------------|---------|--------|----------------|---------|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE |
| OLS | -1.138 | -1.137 | 1.951 | -1.138 | -1.137 | 6.109 |
| IV | 0.602 | 0.074 | 506.6 | 0.802 | 0.331 | 67.86 |
| 2SLS | -0.663 | -0.649 | 1.000 | -0.324 | -0.332 | 1.000 |
| MB2SLS | 1.209 | -0.122 | 1.1e+03 | 0.025 | -0.031 | 1.331 |
| JIVE | -0.965 | -1.781 | 8.5e+03 | 0.440 | 0.752 | 3.1e+03 |
| IJIVE | -0.203 | -0.099 | 183.9 | 0.084 | 0.003 | 1.653 |
| UJIVE | 0.093 | -0.090 | 264.9 | 0.094 | 0.011 | 1.736 |
| FEJIV | 0.369 | -0.003 | 239.8 | 0.090 | 0.014 | 1.645 |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 2.54 | | | 7.48 | |
| $q_{0.05}$ | | 0.02 | | | 3.80 | |
| $q_{0.95}$ | | 5.97 | | | 11.62 | |

Table B.7: Simulation Results for K = 20, "Weak" IV, and Large Monotonicity Violations

| | | N = 3,000 | | | N = 10,000 | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------------|---------|--------|----------------|---------|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE |
| OLS | -1.152 | -1.151 | 1.633 | -1.149 | -1.149 | 4.847 |
| IV | 1.409 | 0.139 | 1.3e+03 | -0.872 | 0.323 | 7.7e+03 |
| 2SLS | -0.740 | -0.749 | 1.000 | -0.371 | -0.371 | 1.000 |
| MB2SLS | -0.276 | -0.290 | 104.8 | 0.059 | -0.005 | 1.658 |
| JIVE | -0.889 | -1.696 | 1.8e+03 | 0.803 | 0.969 | 7.9e+03 |
| IJIVE | -0.672 | -0.202 | 892.2 | 0.131 | 0.053 | 2.075 |
| UJIVE | -0.751 | -0.212 | 377.9 | 0.148 | 0.067 | 2.243 |
| FEJIV | 0.265 | -0.122 | 351.7 | 0.138 | 0.064 | 2.130 |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 2.18 | | | 6.09 | |
| $q_{0.05}$ | | -0.02 | | | 2.32 | |
| $q_{0.95}$ | | 4.66 | | | 9.85 | |

Table B.8: Simulation Results for K = 20, "Weak" IV, and Monotonicity Violations with Weak Cells

| | | N = 3,000 | | | N = 10,000 | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------------|-------|--------|----------------|-------|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE |
| OLS | -0.669 | -0.669 | 29.70 | -0.669 | -0.668 | 105.8 |
| IV | 0.003 | -0.001 | 0.949 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.983 |
| 2SLS | -0.049 | -0.052 | 1.000 | -0.014 | -0.015 | 1.000 |
| MB2SLS | 0.009 | 0.005 | 1.053 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 1.021 |
| JIVE | 0.072 | 0.063 | 1.679 | 0.023 | 0.022 | 1.226 |
| IJIVE | 0.004 | 0.001 | 1.027 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 1.020 |
| UJIVE | 0.007 | 0.002 | 1.047 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 1.023 |
| FEJIV | 0.007 | 0.001 | 1.033 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 1.020 |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 42.75 | | | 131.58 | |
| $q_{0.05}$ | | 31.36 | | | 113.22 | |
| $q_{0.95}$ | | 55.10 | | | 154.91 | |

Table B.9: Simulation Results for K = 20, "Strong" IV, and No Monotonicity Violations

| | | N = 3,000 | | | N = 10,000 | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------------|-------|--------|----------------|-------|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE |
| OLS | -1.027 | -1.027 | 32.72 | -1.025 | -1.025 | 114.2 |
| IV | 0.213 | 0.196 | 3.545 | 0.206 | 0.200 | 6.702 |
| 2SLS | -0.084 | -0.089 | 1.000 | -0.021 | -0.022 | 1.000 |
| MB2SLS | -0.003 | -0.008 | 0.958 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 1.012 |
| JIVE | 0.099 | 0.094 | 1.562 | 0.036 | 0.033 | 1.237 |
| IJIVE | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.980 | 0.007 | 0.005 | 1.025 |
| UJIVE | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.999 | 0.007 | 0.006 | 1.028 |
| FEJIV | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.986 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 1.025 |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 40.58 | | | 124.89 | |
| $q_{0.05}$ | | 31.14 | | | 107.54 | |
| $q_{0.95}$ | | 51.84 | | | 140.35 | |

Table B.10: Simulation Results for K = 20, "Strong" IV, and Moderate Monotonicity Violations

| | | N = 3,000 | | | N = 10,000 | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------------|-------|--------|----------------|-------|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE |
| OLS | -1.032 | -1.033 | 31.52 | -1.032 | -1.030 | 117.0 |
| IV | 0.397 | 0.333 | 13.87 | 0.357 | 0.339 | 22.19 |
| 2SLS | -0.087 | -0.090 | 1.000 | -0.026 | -0.026 | 1.000 |
| MB2SLS | -0.008 | -0.012 | 0.950 | -0.001 | -0.002 | 0.987 |
| JIVE | 0.096 | 0.086 | 1.532 | 0.031 | 0.030 | 1.182 |
| IJIVE | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.986 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 1.002 |
| UJIVE | 0.006 | 0.004 | 1.007 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 1.005 |
| FEJIV | 0.007 | 0.002 | 0.989 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 1.002 |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 39.01 | | | 119.92 | |
| $q_{0.05}$ | | 28.85 | | | 104.08 | |
| $q_{0.95}$ | | 49.38 | | | 136.68 | |

Table B.11: Simulation Results for K = 20, "Strong" IV, and Large Monotonicity Violations

| | | N = 3,000 | | | N = 10,000 | |
|------------------------------------|--------|----------------|-------|--------|----------------|-------|
| A. Estimator Performance | Bias | Median Bias | MSE | Bias | Median Bias | MSE |
| OLS | -1.062 | -1.064 | 25.17 | -1.061 | -1.062 | 91.49 |
| IV | 0.374 | 0.325 | 7.865 | 0.340 | 0.333 | 14.39 |
| 2SLS | -0.101 | -0.101 | 1.000 | -0.032 | -0.030 | 1.000 |
| MB2SLS | -0.004 | -0.011 | 0.987 | -0.001 | 0.001 | 0.990 |
| JIVE | 0.123 | 0.101 | 1.732 | 0.038 | 0.042 | 1.206 |
| IJIVE | 0.006 | -0.002 | 1.022 | 0.004 | 0.007 | 1.005 |
| UJIVE | 0.011 | 0.002 | 1.052 | 0.004 | 0.008 | 1.008 |
| FEJIV | 0.012 | 0.004 | 1.008 | 0.004 | 0.008 | 1.007 |
| B. Pretest for Weak Identification | | | | | | |
| Average \widetilde{F} | | 33.37 | | | 101.53 | |
| $q_{0.05}$ | | 24.50 | | | 85.67 | |
| $q_{0.95}$ | | 42.08 | | | 117.25 | |

Table B.12: Simulation Results for K = 20, "Strong" IV, and Monotonicity Violations with Weak Cells

| | | 2 | \mathbf{Z}_1 | Z | 2 | Z | Z ₃ |
|-------|------------------------|-------|----------------|-------|--------|-------|----------------|
| | | LPM | Probit | LPM | Probit | LPM | Probit |
| ת | Average Share | 0.293 | 0.250 | 0.246 | 0.157 | 0.281 | 0.263 |
| D_1 | Weighted Average Share | 0.321 | 0.304 | 0.277 | 0.253 | 0.315 | 0.327 |
| ת | Average Share | 0.272 | 0.220 | 0.218 | 0.176 | 0.199 | 0.187 |
| D_2 | Weighted Average Share | 0.327 | 0.314 | 0.285 | 0.280 | 0.263 | 0.259 |
| D | Average Share | 0.379 | 0.341 | 0.276 | 0.190 | 0.243 | 0.223 |
| D_3 | Weighted Average Share | 0.379 | 0.382 | 0.316 | 0.283 | 0.293 | 0.307 |

Table C.1: Negative First Stages with Alternative Binarizations

Notes: The table reports summary statistics on the fraction of observations for which $\hat{E}[D_j | Z_k = 1, X = x] - \hat{E}[D_j | Z_k = 0, X = x]$ is negative. "Average Share" treats every applicable regression equally. "Weighted Average Share" weights by the inverse of the number of applicable regressions associated with a given paper. D_j and Z_k are defined as either the original endogenous explanatory variable and instrument (if they are binary) or indicators for whether these variables are above the *j*th and *k*th quartile, respectively, subject to a normalization that Z_k is always associated with a positive estimated coefficient in the linear first stage. Sampling weights and clustered standard errors are used in line with the original papers.

| | | Z | \mathbf{Z}_1 | Z | 2 | Z | Z ₃ |
|-------|--|-------|----------------|-------|--------|-------|----------------|
| | | LPM | Probit | LPM | Probit | LPM | Probit |
| ת | Rejected Papers | 25/25 | 18/20 | 22/25 | 16/18 | 25/25 | 15/19 |
| D_1 | Average Share of Rejections | 0.807 | 0.749 | 0.781 | 0.765 | 0.855 | 0.752 |
| ת | Rejected Papers | 24/25 | 19/22 | 22/25 | 19/21 | 24/25 | 18/21 |
| D_2 | Rejected Papers Average Share of Rejections | 0.789 | 0.756 | 0.715 | 0.749 | 0.789 | 0.768 |
| σ | Rejected Papers | 24/25 | 18/20 | 24/25 | 18/21 | 24/25 | 19/20 |
| D_3 | Rejected Papers Average Share of Rejections | 0.824 | 0.733 | 0.779 | 0.744 | 0.817 | 0.747 |

Table C.2: First-Stage Heterogeneity with Alternative Binarizations

Notes: The table reports results of Wald tests that the coefficients on the interaction terms in regressions of D_j on Z_k , X, and Z_kX are jointly equal to zero. "Rejected Papers" reports the number of papers for which the Bonferroni *p*-value is less than or equal to 0.05. "Average Share of Rejections" reports the average share (across papers) of regressions associated with a given paper for which the corresponding Holm *p*-value is less than or equal to 0.05. D_j and Z_k are defined as either the original endogenous explanatory variable and instrument (if they are binary) or indicators for whether these variables are above the *j*th and *k*th quartile, respectively, subject to a normalization that Z_k is always associated with a positive estimated coefficient in the linear first stage. Sampling weights and clustered standard errors are used in line with the original papers.

| | Average Share of Negative First Stages | | First-Stage Heterogeneity | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--------|---------------------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
| | | | Bonferroni p-Value | | Share of Rejection | |
| | LPM | Probit | LPM | Probit | LPM | Probit |
| Acemoglu et al. (2008) | 0.546 | 0.554 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Albouy (2012) | 0.147 | 0.122 | 0.115 | 0 | 0 | 0.226 |
| Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) | 0.145 | 0.159 | 0.001 | 0 | 0.064 | 0.011 |
| Ananat (2011) | 0.020 | 0.223 | 0.308 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Autor <i>et al.</i> (2013) | 0.009 | 0.036 | 0 | 0 | 0.894 | 0.894 |
| Bazzi and Clemens (2013) | 0.303 | 0.242 | 0 | 1 | 0.750 | 0 |
| Becker <i>et al.</i> (2011) | 0.068 | 0.100 | 0 | 0 | 0.125 | 0.450 |
| Bleakley and Chin (2010) | 0.206 | 0.029 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Brown and Laschever (2012) | 0.134 | 0.143 | 0 | 0 | 0.375 | 0.375 |
| Chalfin (2015) | 0.342 | N/A | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) | 0.123 | 0.105 | 1 | N/A | 0 | N/A |
| Chou et al. (2010) | 0.514 | 0.503 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Collins and Shester (2013) | 0.343 | 0.341 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Decarolis (2015) | 0.595 | 0.568 | 0 | 0 | 0.667 | 1 |
| Dinkelman (2011) | 0.306 | 0.271 | 0 | 0 | 0.158 | 1 |
| Draca et al. (2011) | 0.250 | 0.269 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Guryan and Kearney (2010) | 0.427 | N/A | 0 | N/A | 1 | N/A |
| Hornung (2014) | 0.116 | 0.151 | 0 | 0 | 0.909 | 0.889 |
| Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) | 0.245 | 0.335 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| James (2015) | 0.555 | 0.616 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Kraay (2014) | 0.435 | 0.439 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Lipscomb et al. (2013) | 0 | 0 | 0.018 | 0.002 | 1 | 1 |
| Moser <i>et al.</i> (2014) | 0.671 | 0.626 | 0 | N/A | 1 | N/A |
| Oreopoulos (2006) | 0.463 | 0.434 | 0 | 0 | 0.941 | 0.875 |
| Saiz and Wachter (2011) | 0.152 | 0.165 | 0 | N/A | 1 | N/A |
| Number of Regressions | 988 | 930 | 988 | 899 | 988 | 899 |

Table C.3: Detailed Results on Negative First Stages and First-Stage Heterogeneity

Notes: "Average Share of Negative First Stages" reports the average fraction of observations for which $\hat{E}[D | Z = 1, X = x] - \hat{E}[D | Z = 0, X = x]$ is negative. "First-Stage Heterogeneity" reports results of Wald tests that the coefficients on the interaction terms in regressions of *D* on *Z*, *X*, and *ZX* are jointly equal to zero. "Bonferroni *p*-Value" reports the product of the smallest *p*-value associated with a given paper and the number of applicable regressions in that paper. "Share of Rejections" reports the fraction of applicable regressions associated with a given paper for which the corresponding Holm *p*-value is less than or equal to 0.05. *D* and *Z* are defined as either the original endogenous explanatory variable and instrument (if they are binary) or indicators for whether these variables are above their medians, subject to a normalization that *Z* is always associated with a positive estimated coefficient in the linear first stage. Sampling weights and clustered standard errors are used in line with the original papers.

Appendix D Reanalysis of Stevenson (2018)

| | Specifica | tion #1 | Specifica | ation #2 | Specifica | ation #3 |
|------------------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|
| A. Effects on Conviction | \hat{eta} | $\hat{\sigma}_{\hat{eta}}$ | \hat{eta} | $\hat{\sigma}_{\hat{eta}}$ | \hat{eta} | $\hat{\sigma}_{\hat{eta}}$ |
| MB2SLS | 0.1610*** | 0.0360 | 0.1860*** | 0.0326 | 0.0751*** | 0.0271 |
| JIVE | 0.2127 | 0.1969 | 0.3762 | 0.2783 | 0.3251 | 0.3863 |
| B. Effects on Incarceration Length | β | $\hat{\sigma}_{\hat{eta}}$ | β | $\hat{\sigma}_{\hat{eta}}$ | β | $\hat{\sigma}_{\hat{eta}}$ |
| MB2SLS | 134*** | 47 | 140*** | 41 | 55 | 43 |
| JIVE | -313 | 280 | -225 | 359 | 1,279* | 732 |
| Number of Groups | 43 | 1 | 56 | 3 | 98 | 1 |
| Number of Observations | 327, | 560 | 325, | 915 | 319, | 573 |

Table D.1: Alternative Estimates of the Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction and Incarceration Length

Notes: The data are Stevenson (2018)'s sample of 331,971 arrests in Philadelphia. The outcomes are conviction (Panel A) or incarceration length (Panel B), defined as the maximum days of an incarceration sentence. The treatment is pretrial detention. The instrument is whether a given case was heard by Judge C. Each specification is based on a division of the sample into a number of mutually exclusive groups, with a separate group for each combination of values of selected variables. Specification #1 uses the offense type and race (Black, White, or other) of the defendant. Specification #2 uses the offense type, race, and gender (male or female) of the defendant. Specification #3 uses the offense type, race and gender of the defendant, and three time periods considered by Stevenson (2018). Groups with fewer than three observations in either (*G*, *Z*) combination are dropped. MB2SLS and JIVE are based on the interacted specification and are described in Section 3.3. *Statistically different from zero at the 10% level; **at the 5% level; ***at the 1% level.

| | Specification #1 | ification #1 Specification #2 | |
|------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|---------|
| A. Effects on Conviction | | | |
| 2SLS | 0.496 | 0.486 | 0.301 |
| MB2SLS | 0.829 | 0.956 | 0.377 |
| JIVE | 0.818 | 0.119 | 0.195 |
| UJIVE | 0.619 | 0.671 | 0.229 |
| B. Effects on Incarceration Length | | | |
| 2SLS | 0.051 | 0.019 | 0.030 |
| MB2SLS | 0.049 | 0.021 | 0.017 |
| JIVE | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.031 |
| UJIVE | 0.032 | 0.016 | 0.016 |
| Number of Groups | 431 | 563 | 981 |
| Number of Observations | 327,560 | 325,915 | 319,573 |

Table D.2: Bootstrap *p*-Values for the Comparison of the Noninteracted and Interacted Specifications

Notes: This table revisits the estimates in Tables 8 and D.1. The data are Stevenson (2018)'s sample of 331,971 arrests in Philadelphia. The outcomes are conviction (Panel A) or incarceration length (Panel B), defined as the maximum days of an incarceration sentence. The treatment is pretrial detention. The instrument is whether a given case was heard by Judge C. Each specification is based on a division of the sample into a number of mutually exclusive groups, with a separate group for each combination of values of selected variables. Specification #1 uses the offense type and race (Black, White, or other) of the defendant. Specification #2 uses the offense type, race, and gender (male or female) of the defendant. Specification #3 uses the offense type, race and gender of the defendant, and three time periods considered by Stevenson (2018). Groups with fewer than three observations in either (G, Z) combination are dropped. Each *p*-value is calculated using a bootstrap test of the equality of the estimates in the noninteracted and interacted specification, listed in the first column, are described in Section 3.3.

| | Specification #1 Specification #2 | | Specification #3 |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------|------------------|
| A. Effects on Conviction | | | |
| MB2SLS | 0.008 | 0.000 | 0.450 |
| JIVE | 0.018 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| UJIVE | 0.188 | 0.057 | 0.176 |
| B. Effects on Incarceration Length | | | |
| MB2SLS | 0.404 | 0.490 | 0.030 |
| JIVE | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| UJIVE | 0.010 | 0.108 | 0.006 |
| Number of Groups | 431 | 563 | 981 |
| Number of Observations | 327,560 | 325,915 | 319,573 |

Table D.3: Bootstrap *p*-Values for the Comparison of 2SLS and Other Estimators of the Interacted Specification

Notes: This table revisits the estimates in Tables 8 and D.1. The data are Stevenson (2018)'s sample of 331,971 arrests in Philadelphia. The outcomes are conviction (Panel A) or incarceration length (Panel B), defined as the maximum days of an incarceration sentence. The treatment is pretrial detention. The instrument is whether a given case was heard by Judge C. Each specification is based on a division of the sample into a number of mutually exclusive groups, with a separate group for each combination of values of selected variables. Specification #1 uses the offense type and race (Black, White, or other) of the defendant. Specification #2 uses the offense type, race, and gender (male or female) of the defendant. Specification #3 uses the offense type, race and gender of the defendant, and three time periods considered by Stevenson (2018). Groups with fewer than three observations in either (G, Z) combination are dropped. Each p-value is calculated using a bootstrap test of the equality of the probability limits of 2SLS and other estimators in the interacted specifications (with 250 bootstrap replications). Other estimators of the interacted specification, listed in the first column, are described in Section 3.3.

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